*Managing
North East Calls For Intelligent Solutions – Babangida
• Concept Of
War Against Terrorists Completely Wrong – Obi
• Lack Of
Inter-service Synergy Fuelling Resurgence
• Bad
Elements And Fifth Columnists Fingered
Former
military brass hats have attributed the rebounding of insurgents in territories
hitherto liberated by the Nigerian Armed Forces to a number of factors,
including the
absence of a blueprint for holding/dominating liberated areas,
and the disclosure of vital information and plans to the insurgents, about
military strategies, by insiders.
They are
also of the view that the Federal Government’s concept of war against
terrorists is completely wrong, in addition to the country being plagued by
perennial poor maintenance/sustenance culture syndrome.
The
resurgence of violence in the region and the loss of liberated territories,
attracted the attention of the United States, causing the Department of State
to express worries about the country’s inability to effectively secure and hold
onto territories recaptured from the terrorists, despite the successes recorded
by the Multi-National Joint Task Force.
The position
was contained in the United States country report on terrorism for the year
2016, submitted to the US Congress, in compliance with the title 22 of the US
Code. The report, published on July 19, 2017, highlighted the successes and
failings of the Nigerian Army in the fight against the terrorists.
“Despite
gains made by the MNJTF, much of its reported progress was merely duplication
of failed efforts carried over from the end of the last dry/fighting season.
The Nigerian military was unable to hold and rebuild civilian structures and
institutions in those areas it had cleared,” the report said.
Guardian reported that the Director
of Defence Information, Major General John Eneche, has, however, disagreed with
the report, describing its content as misleading and not portraying the reality
of things in the fight against insurgents in the North East.
He stressed
that the pockets of attacks still experienced were as a result of inside
information by Boko Haram collaborators, whom he believes are still amongst the
military.
But for
Chief Executive Officer (CEO), GoldWater & RiverSand (GWRS) Consults, a defence
and national security resource and solutions outfit, Captain Aliyu Umar
Babangida (rtd): “In my opinion, why the military is unable to hold on to
liberated territories is a combination of two saliently silent factors. First,
there is seemingly no blueprint for holding liberated areas, post decimation
and downgrading of the threat in 2015.
Constituted civil authority, particularly law enforcement agencies may
not have a counter or anti terrorism operations procedure. Consequently,
affected and or liberated areas, will gradually relapse into the
status-quo-ante if those to whom the safe areas are handed over, are not
counter and anti terrorism savvy. Their shortcomings become leverages for
exploit, by the threat.
“The
question thus remains, other than the army, can others, including the Police,
NSCDC, NDLEA, Nigeria Custom Services, the DSS, Nigeria Immigrations Services,
Nigeria Prisons Services etc, be said to be, in the real sense of the word, in
counter, and or anti-terrorism mode? Babangida asked.
He
continued, “What other support elements does the Nigerian Army have? Are
operations resource and solutions assets like the Air Force aerial surveillance
and the relevant communications and information systems being optimally
utilized? Are these systems even in existence at all, as opposed to the army
being overburdened with expectations for results that out-span its traditional
competencies?
While
describing the country as one that suffers from chronic maintenance culture
malaise as evident in “our propensity to put systems and measures in place and
somehow expect these systems to run themselves. We do not track performance,
nor seem to keep records of non-performance. We just seem to drift on and on.
The strategy and measures applied to liberate areas and decimate insurgent
capacity and capability may be suffering from a poor maintenance/sustenance
culture syndrome, which is rife with us.”
Former
military governor of Bayelsa State, Lt. Colonel Paul Edor Obi (rtd), is of the
opinion that, “We are getting the concept of war on terror completely wrong as
we are fixated on conventional warfare and going back in every military
campaign. So, we need to understand what the strategic objective of war against
terror is, and that demands knowing the kind of tactics and the kind of terrors
we are fighting against.
“The
terrorists we are fighting are people who do not have sovereignty, they do not
own a country, and you cannot tell who they are, and where they are. Some of
them are in the general area of Sambisa Forest, which is probably their
stronghold, but you do not look at that to say we have taken their territory
because in every military operation, you dislodge and dominate through
different measures, physically, airpower, making sure that those places are registered
so that when the enemies return they can be taken out.
The former
governor maintained: “We need to be clear on strategy to deploy in the war
against terror, and unless we get it clearly, we are going to be fixated on
deploying strategy for conventional warfare, holding territory. The war on
terror is a long drawn war and if we focus on the strategic objective and come
up with a strategy for dealing with this, it will be easier to deal with Boko
Haram, and in deed any terror organisation.”
Obi, who is
convinced that Boko Haram has penetrated the security forces, especially with
the bombing of military formations, also cautioned the military on making some
pronouncements and giving ultimatums publicly saying, “We need to talk less and
do a lot more using intelligence, otherwise people will begin to loose
confidence in the government and the military. I know our security forces are
doing a very difficult and complex job because fighting terrorism is not easy.
The military command should step back on making political comments and focus on
their assignment.”
Air
Commodore, Yusuf Anas (rtd) is also in agreement that there should be
inter-service synergy if the insurgents must be purged from the communities.
According to
him, after the military has liberated a territory, there is supposed to be
collaboration and synergy with other security agencies like the Nigerian
Police, NSCDC, Immigration Services, to take over, and establish their presence
there, by sending manpower and resources that can help restore normalcy.
“Somehow,
the other security agencies have not been able to take up the challenge of
taking over some of those territories. The military needs the assistance of
other security agencies to be able to achieve results,” he said.
Former
Commander, Brigade of Guards, General Yakubu Rimdan (rtd), said the country is
losing liberated territories to Boko Haram because “there are elements in those
areas, who have comprised themselves and leak vital information to the
insurgents about military’s strategies and plans.”
Rimdan said
that unless such bad elements are done away with in the localities, complete
victory over Boko Haram will not be easy. “This is because, after the military
operations and captured areas liberated, these same elements will go and tell
the insurgents to come back and attack people.”
Rimdam, who
also claimed that politicians were funding the insurgents, added that they want
the carnage to continue unabated because “it is from it that they make their
money. The military should fish out those moles who are doing that unpatriotic
act.”
Civil war
veteran and professor of Military Strategy at the Nigerian Defence Academy
(NDA), Moses Tedheke, thinks differently and believes that reports that the
insurgents were reclaiming liberated territories was tantamount to propaganda
intended to weaken the Nigerian Armed Forces.
The former
Head of Department of Political Science at the NDA, said poor funding of the
military in the war against the insurgents was responsible for the prolonged
battle.
The
university teacher, who said, “as a matter of fact, it will be difficult to end
the Boko Haram insurgency,” added, “If we cannot confront this insurgency
properly and deal decisively with all those financing terrorist groups, as well
as those who looted funds meant for arms procurement, why are we now beginning
to blame the Nigerian Armed Forces for surrendering to Boko Haram?
Retired
soldier and veteran journalists in Borno State, Ibrahim Mshelizza, said by
reclaiming some territories, Boko Haram insurgents are now out to show people
that they are still around, despite being decimated technically by the
military.
He therefore
urged the military to step up the fight in order to finish strong in a short
while.
Giving
details of attacks that lend credence to the recapture of liberated
territories, Babangida said: “From January to July 31, 2017, 38 reported
incidents of insurgent attacks took place in the North East, with the majority
occurring in Borno State. A breakdown of this indicates a maximum of eight
attacks (and minimum of two attacks) and a seven-month average of five attacks
per month, except in April 2017, when only two attacks were recorded, or
reported.
“We also
observed within the time frame that a monthly average of three days frequency
between one attack and the other persisted, while a seven-month attack
frequency average, rested on four days between any two attacks. In some
isolated cases, attacks recorded a one-day frequency between the last and the
next, with other occurring concurrently (i.e. same day, different locations).
What intelligence can be gleaned from these figures and others in our holding,
can help immensely in identifying the habitual traits of the challenges as they
unfold. For example, the ability of the insurgents to attack locations
successfully increased at a point, from an average of three days, to 24 hours,
between one attack and the other,” the retired captain said.
He
continued, “Weighing in on the generally publicised position that insurgency
has been downgraded or decimated post-2015, the figures above simply indicate
that the insurgents are rebounding. Given the logistics and other related
consideration for planning a successful attack, this could mean the ability to
do so in an average of three days, is a likely indicator of some form of
re-organisation.
On the way
out, Babangida said: “We must begin to measure activity sequences to control
outcomes; track performance for continuous improvement; keep and update a
lessons learnt process data, to avoid doing same thing same way. All these are
not in our resonance as a people and nation. The Army is just part and parcel
of us… it is not an isolated entity as such.”
He stressed
the need for the country to “address a cogent post decimation and liberated
areas policy for all stakeholders; lean heavily on deliberately outlined
benchmarks, and key performance indicators for results; be a bit more open to
third party involvement for informed and measured solutions.
“One must
warn though, that doing this calls for meta-cognition on the part of
intelligence and law enforcement chieftains; professional and intellectual
rigour from all stakeholder groups and agencies, not less so commitment to
purpose of all involved.
“We must
never underestimate the creative ability of the terror masterminds, who
incidentally are not the ragtag itinerant fighters we see getting killed from
time to time. Managing the North East calls for intelligent solutions,” he
concluded.
0 Comments